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PLEASURE AND PAIN IN EDUCATION.

BEFORE entering upon my subject proper, it will be necessary to say something about the place of pleasure in moral action generally.

It is, of course, at once evident that the importance we attach to pleasure and pain in education, together with our view of their right use,—whether as incitement or deterrent, reward or punishment,—must rest upon and flow from our view of the place and importance of pleasure in our ideal of life. The end of education is the production of a good and capable human being. Before, then, we can with advantage set ourselves to investigate the process of that production, we must have clear ideas as to the qualities of the product aimed at. With regard to that particular quality of a good and efficient life, with which we are here concerned, we want to know—

1. What place and importance do we desire that those we educate shall assign to pleasure in their ideal and conduct of life?

2. How shall we best use to that end those susceptibilities to pleasure and pain which all possess?

That pleasure is a good, and that pain is an evil, will, with certain reservations, be accepted by all. But that pleasure is *the* good, or pain necessarily or absolutely evil, it is my object and intention to deny. The point, as to the good of pleasure, upon which the widest agreement will be found, is its effect upon the vital energies of the individual as a whole.

1. Happiness, speaking generally, heightens life, and happiness is a state of well-being, or “feeling of general content with one’s existence,”* to which pleasurable activity is a necessary condition.

2. Pleasure, moreover, is the mark of healthy faculty in

* See Bradley’s “Ethical Studies,” p. 121.

normal activity, and tends—speaking generally—to increase the activity and further the health.

3. Pleasure in what we do is, when the activity is good, its crowning grace. "A man is not a good man at all," says Aristotle, "unless he takes pleasure in noble deeds. No one would call a man just who did not take pleasure in doing justice, nor generous who took no pleasure in acts of generosity; and if this be so, then actions done in accordance with virtue must be in themselves pleasurable."*

4. Pleasure has also been defined as "the feeling of self-realizedness,"† and self-realization is one of the forms in which we express the end of living.

5. Further, it has become common of late among philosophical and psychological writers of the idealistic school to speak of pleasure as "the sense of value for consciousness,"‡ and though I think the term is open to criticism, it at least shows the immense importance that is being attached to pleasure by even those writers and thinkers who may be supposed to hold a brief against what is known as "the pleasure doctrine."

If, then, pleasure be so "fair a fruit"; if it hold so important a place in life; if it tend, on the whole, to heighten life in general and to increase function in particular; if it be the mark of the normal activity of healthy faculty; if it be the sense of value for the individual consciousness; if it be the feeling of self-realizedness; if it be the crowning grace in the good action of a good man's life, shall we not, above all things, aim at pleasure?

No: for to do so is to aim at an accompaniment,—a kind of by-product,—but is not to aim at the fundamental necessity of our humanity. It is to mistake the sense of value for value itself; it is to mistake the bloom of health upon the cheek for that right-ordered system of physical activities which is health itself.

* Aristotle's "Ethics," bk. i. chap. vi.

† Bradley's "Ethical Studies," p. 234.

‡ See "An Introduction to Social Philosophy," J. S. Mackenzie, p. 217; Dewey's "Psychology," p. 16.

What we really need is life, function, self-realization, nobility of character; and at these we must aim. That pleasure is normally connected with all of these is true, but we may not let the amount of pleasure excited in us, or promised to us by any of these ideas, or by any other idea, be the test of its value for us as human beings. To do so is to leave us without an argument for the drunkard or the voluptuary. Neither may we make the *higher* pleasures our aim, for this is to introduce a new standard, and at the same time to be guilty of the stupidity of failing to see that we have done so, and therefore of failing to use our real standard in our judgment of action. Neither may we say that though the greatest amount of pleasure *to the individual* cannot now, as things are, be the individual aim or the test of right conduct, yet the greatest amount of pleasure *to the whole* is even now the test of right conduct and the true aim of the individual, while, in a perfect society to come, when complete adaptation to environment shall have taken place, the greatest amount of pleasure to the individual and the greatest amount of pleasure to the whole will have become coincident. We may not say these things because, among other reasons, the question which of several possible courses of action will result in the greatest amount of pleasure to the whole is a wholly insoluble problem, and because the sort of perfect society indicated by this ideal is a wholly inhuman conception. Human life implies progress, progress implies readjustment, and readjustment implies pain.

The shortest and simplest way to treat my subject will be, perhaps, to state what I believe to be the proper place of pleasure in the ideal of a normal, healthy, good person, rather than to criticise existing theories on the subject.

The end of life I shall call self-realization. Self-realization is only possible through the various self-directed activities of the individual as a member of society. To make himself the most efficient possible member of his society is the same thing to a man as to realize himself to the greatest extent possible. All things which further these desirable activities, this desirable self-realization, are valuable to us; all things are finally judged as good or bad by their relation to this end.

All pleasure is dependent upon activity, and is judged good or bad according to the nature of the activity with which it is connected. Pleasure can, therefore, never be desirable in itself, regardless of the *kind of pleasure* which it is, and the kind of pleasure depends upon the kind of activity with which it is connected. Pleasure in activity may be of three kinds: (1) it may express for us the sense of value which the object of desire excites in us; or (2) it may be the "feeling of self-realizedness,"* the sense of having affirmed or expressed the self, which accompanies the attainment of the object of desire. The existence of the pleasure in both these cases depends upon the relation between the object of desire, or of attainment, and the man's character. A glass of brandy excites an anticipatory thrill in the drunkard; the thought of a well-ordered community calls up a glow in the mind of a good citizen. The moral value of the pleasure, in both instances, depends upon the nature of the object or activity with which it is connected, the value of the object or activity being ultimately judged by its relation to the man's life as a whole, his life, that is, as an efficient member of society, as a good man. (3) Pleasure is also the mark of the normal activity of healthy faculty, and is to be prized as indicating such activity; but the desirability of the activity itself must depend, as in the former cases, upon its relation to the man's life as a whole. The pleasures of the activities of parenthood are doubtless good in the normal human life, but for the individual they may be evil. Their desirability must depend upon the relation of these activities to the man's chief end.

If intensity of interest, if devotion to ideal ends be equivalent to "pleasure in ideal ends" (which I do not think, but which seems to be largely contended), then it is eminently desirable that we should feel intensity of pleasure in ideal ends. But the desirability of the pleasure depends, not upon its intensity, nor upon its duration, but upon the nature of the end to which it attaches.

The pleasure of achievement is, obviously, most desirable.

* See Bradley's "Ethical Studies," p. 234.

Without it we should be but "frustrate ghosts." But here again the desirability depends, not upon the amount of the pleasure, nor upon mere achievement as such (though something may be said for that), but upon the nature of that which is achieved.

Pleasure, then, is to be prized as indicating healthy faculty, strong interest, achievement, as, moreover, "perfecting the working," to use Aristotle's words, as generally heightening life and increasing vitality; but it is to be prized because it indicates or furthers these good things, and it derives all its value from its relation, through these things, to the end of life.

There is one difficulty which must be met here before leaving this part of my subject: but I shall deal with it as shortly as possible.

This is the notion that "to have pleasure in doing what we do" is the same thing as "doing what we do for the sake of pleasure." No one who has not thought about it ever makes this mistake. It is only when we begin to think why we do "so" and "so" that we grow confused about it. No one would think, for instance, of calling the carpenter who is an artist in his craft, and who works therefore with zeal and enjoyment, a "pleasure seeker." No one would dream that the enthusiast for social reform, the man who spends the passion of his life in the service of his ideal, is, therefore, because of his passionate devotion, a voluptuary. Yet this confusion means just this. A pure voluptuary is hard to find; but we all know those who are prone to be moved to action by the thought, "this will give me pleasure," and also those who are moved by the pleasure or interest felt in the object or end served, and we never confuse these persons in real life. The man who, with self-forgetful ardor, serves the object of his devotion with joy is never mistaken by us for the person who reflects, upon each occasion of action, "Shall I enjoy doing this?" "shall I have pleasure resulting from this?" and who decides for or against according as the answer is, "yes" or "no." It is only when some one suggests to us, "But your enthusiast, your man of ardent devotion,

does, after all, the thing he likes best to do: wherein, then, does he differ from your selfish person?" that we grow confused in our thoughts.

A little further thought is the only cure. We shall find, if we examine the subject carefully, that pleasure or interest excited in us by the idea of an object (as, for instance, the painting of a picture, or the sanitation of a town) is not only different from, but absolutely incompatible with, "my pleasure" as an object or end. If the pleasure which moves to action be pleasure felt in the idea of the picture or healthy town, it cannot, at the same moment, be pleasure felt in the idea of "my pleasure." Pleasure to be gained may at any moment become an object to me, but if so, it must excite present pleasure or interest in me before it can move me to action. That the pleasure which is aimed at cannot be the pleasure which is felt surely needs no proving. If it were so we should never need to act at all in order to gain pleasure. To desire a pleasure would be to have it. To think with pleasure of the pleasure of a good dinner would be to have the pleasure of the good dinner. A hungry man would make short work of such logic.

I hope, then, it will be taken as proved—it is certainly capable of the most absolute proof—that to find my pleasure in an end is a wholly different thing from making my end pleasure.

I said at the beginning of my paper that we wanted to know, first, What place do we desire that those whom we educate should assign to pleasure in their ideal of life? So far I have tried to answer that question. I then said our second question must be, How can we best use to that end the susceptibilities to pleasure and pain of which all are possessed? In other words, What is the place of pleasure and pain in education?

I think it desirable to take, first, intellectual education, and afterwards moral education, though, in point of fact, the two are so inter-related that we shall find it impossible in practice to take any step in the interest of either without finding the interests of the other involved in the most vital way. All

education is ultimately moral education, inasmuch as all education is the development of rational interests or of desirable capacities. But we use the term moral education generally and properly in a more restricted sense,—in a sense in which it means the systematic development of character. In the education of children the term must be still more restricted: it must mean formation of those habits of conduct out of which grow moral judgment, and the will to be good, as contrasted with simply the will to do this or that good thing. I shall, then, for convenience' sake, treat first of intellectual and secondly of moral education, but I wish to emphasize my sense of the fatal mistake we make when we separate these two interests.

All intellectual interests are of moral interest, for the acquisition of truth is part of the moral ideal, while the training of the mind in its pursuit is also the training of the will, as, for instance, in attention. All moral interests, on the other hand, have their intellectual quality. They are *interests*, not merely habits. Education means the development of these interests and the exercise of the faculties involved. Disaster invariably follows in practice from the separation of either of these forms of education from the other. It is fatal to think that moral considerations are not involved in the acquisition of truth and the development of faculty, or in the mode in which these are furthered or the end in subordination to which they are pursued. It is equally fatal to think that moral interests can be intelligently furthered by those who are deficient in intelligence and poverty-stricken in intellectual interests. The immorality of "masses" of the "moral" teaching of our day is due to this fatal separation. Having lost touch with the best intellectual life of our time, it has lost moral life also.

Having, then, premised so much, I may, without fear of being misunderstood, treat, for purposes of convenience, first one and then the other of these aspects of all education.

First, then, intellectual education. In the earliest years of children there is but little trouble for intelligent teachers. The mental appetite of a healthy child is almost as keen and is certainly much more insatiable than his bodily appetite.

His mind is as instantly and trustingly agape at every moment as are the mouths of the hedgerow fledglings at every rustle in the leaves about their nest. The development of that appetite and that child's pleasure in the process will depend for the most part on the quality of the food dropped in. Difficulty may be perhaps for the first time felt,—drudgery may seem probable, if not inevitable,—when first a systematic education is commenced.

Mr. Morris has abolished all systematic education in his most recent "Earthly Paradise."* But so far from agreeing with Mr. Morris that the best way to develop interest in knowledge is to leave education entirely unsystematic, I believe that the only true way is to make it much more systematic than it is at present. Of course by systematic I do not mean rigid, unelastic, of one pattern and one content for every mind, but I mean more organized, more unified towards the end of all education, more diversified within that unity to meet the need of individual cases, more illuminated in every direction by our growing knowledge of the human mind and our growing recognition of the human end.

Now, the first effect of systematic education upon children is apt to be the sense of restraint. They cannot any longer flit, like butterflies, from interest to interest, abandoning each the moment a new one catches the attention, governed only by the impulse of the moment. They are called upon for a fixed and directed attention, for a self-governing exercise of will. At once the teacher's position with regard to pleasure and pain must be decided, at once the question becomes of the acutest moral as well as of the acutest intellectual interest.

Shall a teacher permit a child to roam from object to object, on the theory that nothing can be properly learned without interest or pleasure in the learning? Or shall he, on the theory that obedience and self-control are of more importance still, coerce the child by fear or pain? No one, I suppose, of natural insight or moral force would dream of simply adopting either one of these extremes, though either would be justifiable on

* "News from Nowhere," by W. Morris.

current theories as to the place of pleasure. The teacher's aim, at this particular point, is the development of a particular interest, the production in the child of that pleasure which will keep him at his work, and make him do it well. If the conditions were all they ought to be, this pleasure would be a natural result. If it is not, then it is the teacher's business to see wherein the conditions are wanting. The happy transformation that has taken place in our own time in the education of little children is an apt illustration of what may be done in this way, and, perhaps, no better answer could be given to any one who is troubled about these things than an introduction to any well-ordered kindergarten. The adaptation of the knowledge which it is desired to impart to the needs and capacities of the pupils has been there carried to an admirable point and with the happiest results. The relation of the new fact to some familiar interest; the presentation of each new object to as many different senses as possible; the rational adoption of a varied programme; the saving of this variety from chaos by the dominance of some idea which is presented again and again under many different forms; the happy, eager, interested, good children who generally result from this treatment lead one to hope that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, natural interests intelligently developed and the pleasure of doing work that is fitted to the capacities and character of the worker, will be all-sufficient spurs to the acquisition of knowledge and the performance of duty.

In intellectual education, then, we shall aim at developing the pleasure of natural interests and the pleasure of the activity of healthy faculty, and when pleasure is slow to show itself, we shall seek to develop it by linking the new subject on to an old interest, and thus securing for the new, also, a value which will express itself as pleasure. This is the aim and this will be the method. But this may not always succeed. In spite of the wisest selection of subject, in spite of its most skilful treatment on the part of the teacher, in spite of the brightest capacity on the part of the pupil, there will come times when interest is not roused, when attention is not caught, and all seems for the moment at a stand-still. What

has now to be done becomes a question of what we distinguish as *moral* education. That is to say, at this point, the emphasis passes to the moral aspect. Both interests are present throughout, but here we distinctly feel that the incidence of emphasis has altered.

When a child fails to respond with pleasure to the object presented to him, whether that be the acquisition of a piece of knowledge or the performance of some duty, to what must his teacher appeal? First, I think, beyond all doubt, to the child's habit of obedience, a habit which may be well begun in any child before it is a month old. If parents were not too foolish or too careless to give themselves the trouble of insisting upon even an infant's obedience, they would spare much pain afterwards, both to themselves and to their children. But suppose the habit of obedience to have been formed, and the child to respond to his teacher's authoritative demand as promptly as a soldier responds to the "attention" of his officer; can we leave him there? When the teacher is all that he ought to be, the instinctive obedience is probably followed so closely by the notion of doing as the teacher wishes, with the motive of pleasing the teacher, that nothing further may be needed. But this motive may not exist, or it may not be sufficient. How, then, is the child's will to be buttressed? The point is to rouse his will so that he may control himself in the case in hand.

It will make the matter easier, I think, if we look first at the case of an adult who finds himself in a similar difficulty, and see what would be the ideal conduct for him. Our treatment of the child then will be that which is best calculated to produce the ideal attitude. What happens when we find ourselves face to face with a duty which is, for the moment, distasteful to us, or which, from its relation to our character or circumstances, must necessarily involve much pain to us in the doing of it? How do we help ourselves? What makes us do our duty?

To the ideally good man the one thing necessary is the clear apprehension of the thing as "his duty," as the right thing to be done. No other spur is necessary. He never

stops to think what pleasure will accrue to him, or what pain from the doing of it. He does not need to strengthen his will by the thought of the pained disapproval of those whom he most honors and holds most dear; he does not need to remind himself of the public esteem which may follow on his faithfulness to duty, the public disgrace which may follow on his unfaithfulness. These things, if he think of them, may make it easier for him to do his duty. But he needs none of them. The value to him of that which has to be done as part of his ideal of a good man's life, even if for the moment it fail to arouse in him a sense of value for its own sake, will be wholly adequate to insure his fidelity to that ideal. His character, in other words, will be the sufficient fulcrum of his will. And in this faithfulness to his ideal he will find a stern joy, no matter what the contemporaneous pain involved may be. It seems, indeed, a misuse of words to call this joy "pleasure," yet it is beyond all doubt a desirable state of consciousness. It is what Carlyle called "blessedness"; what the Bible calls "peace." A good man will not be much given to reflect upon this. He will be too much interested at the time in what has to be done; he will be too ready afterwards to pass on to the next thing needed. But if he does reflect upon it he will know that it is of more value to him than any other state of consciousness whatsoever. The point, however, which it most concerns us to note here is that if he is a good man he will never be determined to his action by desire for this state of feeling. To do so, indeed, would be to fail to get the feeling. The feeling is the satisfaction of having been faithful to his ideal *for its own sake*. To make peace of conscience our motive is as selfish in its way as to make bodily ease our motive, and it has the additional disadvantage of being hopelessly illogical. The goodness of a good act depends, ultimately, upon the will to do it for its own sake, as part of the ideal of a good life in the mind of him who does it.

A man's sense of the value of a contemplated action may be greatly increased by the more vivid presentation to him of its relation to other parts of conduct, the value of which are felt by him more acutely. This, of course, is not sup-

plying a new motive, but is merely rendering the conception of the present object at once fuller, more intelligent, and more powerful, by allying it at more points to the man's character.

Once outside the moral motive proper,—*i.e.*, the intrinsic value of the thing to be done,—we may present a multitude of motives varying in worthiness from the motive of winning the approval of the best people we know, down through the hope of public approval or fear of public disgrace to the lowest motives of all,—anticipation of private material gain or fear of private loss, whether physical pain or other. The worthiness of the motive with which we seek to strengthen the will of the morally weak will be less or greater, just in proportion as the object in which we try to arouse his interest appeals to a desire for mere personal pleasure, or to the pleasure of that higher self in which is involved the good of others and our own moral approval. For instance, the appeal to a man who wavers in willing what is right, calling upon him to think of what some friend would think,—some friend who is to him the highest embodiment he knows of his highest ideal,—is a noble appeal so long as it suggests to the man being worthy of his friend's approval. If the man be so far lost to right as to say, "Oh, my friend need never know," then the approval, so far as it remains an object, is an immoral one. That is to say, the man has really ceased to desire his friend's moral approval. He desires his friend's *favor*, and he is dishonorable enough to be willing to accept that on false grounds. But when the man, though weak, is honest, then the suggestion of what his friend's judgment would be strengthens his conscience and his will, and helps him to realize his better self. Similarly the appeal to regard for public opinion is best when attention is directed to the public conscience rather than to possible public favor or disfavor; and this can be effectively done only when the public referred to is morally better than the man.

But supposing that all these appeals fail. Supposing that we cannot educate the man's conscience by suggesting what will be the judgment of his friend, that we cannot quicken his will through love of his friend and desire to be worthy of his

approval; suppose he be defiant enough to disregard public opinion, and reckless enough to be unmoved by counsels of prudence, must we leave him there?

If the man does what he ought not to do, and if his fault is sufficiently serious, has society no duty to interfere in its corporate form and punish the offender against its life? Is dread of this punishment a wholly mean motive to present to the man? Mr. Morris, in the "News" he brings us from "Nowhere," seems to report that this is the state of opinion in that region. May "Nowhere" retain it long!

That incentives to wrong-doing might be immensely diminished in a more rationally and humanely ordered society than ours is indeed a thought that all will welcome, and probably most hold in some form or other, and we can but be grateful to Mr. Morris for the eloquence with which he has preached the doctrine, and for the sense of beauty he awakes in us by his latest presentation of it. But it has seemed to other thinkers as humane as Mr. Morris, and—if one may be pardoned saying so—more profound in their application of their humanity, that the ever-deepening complexity of life and the ever-widening range of human interests might involve the increase, both in range and value, of the sacrifices possibly demanded from the individual.* If this be so, we cannot get rid of the difficulty in point by simply illuminating it from our future ideal.

It is true that to be deterred simply by fear of pain is not to be moved by a moral motive at all. But repression of the evil nature by pain, or by the fear of pain, may be the condition of the better nature with the better motive having a chance to assert itself. Which of us has not at some time echoed the heart-wrung prayer, "Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow." Which of us has not looked back with gratitude on pain through which his judgment was enlightened or his will strengthened? It is well to believe that there is a better self in every one, and that by punishment we take the side of that better self as

* Green's "Prolegomena," pp. 296-299.

against the worst self which we repress. Punishment by the state—*i.e.*, by society in its organized form—carries with it peculiar advantages, and has a peculiar dignity. It is, at least in idea, free from mere personal malice or private revenge. It is the pronouncement of unbiased persons upon the merits of the case; it is the assertion by society of the inviolability of its common life; it is the demand of society upon the individual to recognize his responsibility as a moral agent and member of society,* or rather it is the enforcement of that demand, strengthening it may be the individual to enforce that demand upon himself, or making him conscious of it where he was before unconscious. The society, therefore, that fails to punish its criminals, fails not only in its duty of protection to the rest of society, but fails in its duty towards the criminals themselves. It fails, moreover,—and this is the worst failure of all,—to recognize the common interest in goodness and the common duty therefore of punishment. It fails, in short, to recognize society as a spiritual unity.

The whole question of the nature and function of punishment is of the utmost importance, but it is too vast a subject to be more than touched upon here. It must suffice us to get sufficient notions about it to justify us in accepting it as an instrument in the moral education of the individual, and to guide us, in a general way, in its use.

First, then, punishment is due as vindicating the spiritual unity of society; as expressing a sense of public wrong; as emphasizing the responsibility of the individual.

Second, in punishment we should aim at bringing home to the individual that responsibility; at repressing certain evil tendencies or habits by visiting the acts to which they give rise with pain; at taking the side of his better self as against the worse self which we repress.

Third, the form and extent of the punishment must be decided according to the merits of individual cases. Mere retaliation, as Aristotle long ago pointed out, may fail con-

* Bradley's "Ethical Studies," p. 24 and foll. See *International Journal of Ethics*, vol. ii., No. 1, art. "The Theory of Punishment."

spicuously in rendering that justice which is its primary justification. The blow with which a strong man might kill a child or a woman, might, if inflicted upon him in punishment, be productive of little or no effect. Moreover, though in some instances, "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" may, as some moderns contend, bring home to the offender, in the most pointed manner, the nature of his offence; such crude methods must become ever less and less necessary with the development of self-conscious intelligence. The form and extent, therefore, of punishment had best be regulated by the degree of responsibility of the offender, and by the way a particular punishment will affect him. A fifty-pound fine to a rich man would mean much less than one pound to a poor man; a week's imprisonment to a man who is responsible head of his own business would mean much more than a month to a loafer.

There is another powerful factor in what I may call education by pain. This is discipline. We think of punishment as pain inflicted for an offence committed. We think of discipline as pain submitted to by way of precaution or development.

One is one's own best disciplinarian, but many stand in need of external aid in the enforcement of this salutary pain. Sometimes, when the tendency to be fought against has become a mania,—as with a drunkard,—the only way may be complete starvation of the tyrannous appetite. But I am inclined to think that the best, perhaps the only, effective discipline is the exercise of the deficient qualities of character, exercise, that is, of those qualities, deficiency of which has made possible the excess of their opposite.* Thus the drunkard must, beyond doubt, deny continually his craving for strong drink, but he must also develop his interests in life, he must strengthen, in every possible way, his will. One may do this continually if one is on the watch. One may set one's self to endure pain just for the sake of developing one's endurance; one may deny one's self unimportant pleasures just for the sake of keeping one's self in hand, and one may

* Aristotle's "Ethics," bks. iii. and iv.

also exercise one's self of set purpose where one is especially weak. The stingy person may seek for opportunities of giving; the spendthrift may take upon himself serious money responsibilities, with heavy penalties attached to failure; the physically lazy man may insist upon himself that he rise early in the morning, that he avoid a more than necessarily luxurious couch, that he take a certain amount of physical exercise every day; the woman whose fastidiousness causes a revolt from ugliness and dirt which threatens her human sympathy, may force herself to go, in the furtherance of some service of humanity, where ugliness and dirt abound; the strong-willed, vigorous, healthy person, who feels an unbrotherly contempt for the weak-willed, and has a barbarous want of insight into the woes of the physically feeble, might with advantage cultivate the acquaintance of at least one moral wreck, whom he might try to refit with some of his abounding energy, might with profit become a visitor in a hospital ward, if Fate have denied him the opportunity of such study and such sympathy nearer home. We shall persevere with this cultivation of the deficient qualities by the exercise of the faculties involved until that exercise is attended with pleasure. We shall look out for this pleasure as a sign of growth. We shall prize it, not simply as pleasure,—we might have gained more pleasure some other way,—but as marking development of desirable faculty.

This, then, is broadly the method of education by or through Pain. I would now speak of education by and through Pleasure.

I may pass perhaps lightly over the great educative force of public approval, because already our right attitude towards that has been indicated. I would just add that though not in itself or for its own sake a legitimate moral aim, it is yet one of the most powerful stimulants and auxiliaries to moral action. We should endeavor to utilize this social force, so powerfully educative when the public is noble, by allying ourselves and by trying to induce others to ally themselves with all those higher expressions of social opinion, those associations which exist for the purpose of furthering the

realization of high aims. The enthusiasm of ten men banded together for a common end will be far more than ten times the enthusiasm of one man striving alone. Further, it will be our duty to try, each one of us, so to influence public opinion around us that social approval may be a help and not a hinderance to the moral life of the individual.

There is one great—perhaps pre-eminent—medium of education by means of pleasure of which I want chiefly to speak. It is less important than the medium of social approval in that the area of its influence is, so far at least, less extended; but it is more important in that it is the expression of the deepest insight brought to bear upon human life. I mean the great medium of art.

Art has for its function the relation of truth to us through the emotions. It must reveal beauty, it must make goodness dear, or it is not true art. All art is a comment upon life; all art is a selection, an emphasis; all noble art is the presentation in forms of beauty of the deepest and most permanent human interests.* It is the revelation of the meaning of life. The real artist is no mere imitator; he is a seer, a maker. Selecting, by his gift of insight, the permanent and the true, he embodies, by his creative imagination, these ideas in suitable forms, divested of extraneous or confusing adjuncts, so that they are apprehended by us and move us as they never did before. It is such a seer and such a maker, such a lover of the beautiful and the good, such a discernor of the permanent and the real, who, penetrating into the hidden heart and meaning of our life, dares to say to us,—

“O world, as God has made it! All is beauty;
And, knowing this is love, and love is duty,
What further may be sought for or declared?”†

(Those of us who find it difficult to echo Browning's words may do well to consider whether the difficulty arises from our greater or from our lesser insight.)

* Dewey's "Psychology," pp. 193, 200, 313-322.

† Browning's "Guardian Angel."

This, I claim, is the function of all fine art; but the different arts are capable of it in different degrees. Those arts in which the appeal is more preponderatingly sensuous—as, for instance, music and painting—are necessarily less adequate to their high end than that greatest art of all, the art of Poetry. “Here for the first time,” says Mr. Dewey, “art becomes thoroughly ideal.”

I cannot better recommend the point of view I wish to put forward than by giving it in the words of one of the most lovable exponents of the loveliness of the art he so loved. In his exquisite “Defence of Poesie” Sir Philip Sidney says,—

“The ending end of all earthly learning being virtuous action, those skills that most serve to bring forth that have a most just title to be princes over all the rest; wherein, if we can show it rightly, the poet is worthy to have it before any other competitors.”

Then, having compared the power of the Poet, as a teacher, with the power of the Historian and the moral Philosopher, whom he rightly considers his most formidable rivals, and having made some of the most penetrating and profound remarks upon their relation, he says,—

“For who will be taught, if he be not moved with desire to be taught? . . . Now, therein, of all sciences, is our poet the monarch. For he doth not only show the way but giveth so sweet a prospect into the way, as will entice any man to enter into it: nay, he doth as if your journey should lie through a fair vineyard, at the very first give you a cluster of grapes that, full of that taste, you may long to pass further. He beginneth not with obscure definitions, which must blur the margin with interpretations and load the memory with doubtfulness, but he cometh to you with words set in delightful proportions, either accompanied with or prepared for the well-enchancing skill of music; and with a tale, forsooth, he cometh unto you with a tale which holdeth children from play, and old men from the chimney-corner; and, pretending no more, doth intend the winning of the mind from wickedness to virtue. . . . For even those hard-hearted, evil men, who think virtue a school-name and know no other good but *indulgere genio*, and therefore despise the austere admonitions of the philosopher, and feel not the inward reason they stand upon, yet will be content to be delighted, which is all the good fellow-poet seems to promise; and so steal to see the form of goodness which, seen, they cannot but love, ere themselves be aware, as if they took a medicine of cherries. . . . And so a conclusion not unfitly ensues: that as virtue is the most excellent resting-place for all worldly learning to make his end of, so poetry, being the most familiar to teach it and most princely to move towards it, in the most excellent work, is the most excellent workman.”

It must not be inferred that I quote Sir Philip Sidney as supporting the unsupportable hypothesis that the justification or measure of art is to be found in its teaching of morality. The justification of art is the part it plays in the realization of the human spirit. I would but emphasize that aspect of art which is of especial interest from the point of view of the present inquiry.

After dwelling upon such high themes in such sweet words, and in company with so lovely a spirit, it is unwelcome to turn to the consideration of a far less lovely thought which is more current among us to-day, and about which, therefore, I must say one word before passing on. I mean that doctrine of which Mr. Spencer is the most distinguished exponent: that the natural pains and pleasures attaching to individual acts are the best, and, as sometimes seems implied, the wholly adequate means of moral education, desire for the pleasantness of those things found pleasant and fear of the pain of those things found painful being the ultimate and dominant motive.

I must not stop to criticise this theory as it deserves. I may only relate it to the view which I am advocating by pointing out, first, that the fundamental motive postulated—*i.e.*, desire for pleasure—puts it out of court in our present inquiry; and, second (which we may send as a parting shot after its retreating form), that it is but another instance of the tendency of Mr. Spencer to undervalue the importance of *consciousness* in human life. It is education we are talking of, and we mean by that the conscious application of means to an end not the elimination of “interference,” not the handing over of our pupils to “nature.” The idea, indeed, is incapable of logical application in a civilized community.

And now, having cleared our minds by a glance at the ideal attitude of the good man, in face of a painful duty; having tried to find out what are the pains to be inflicted, the pleasures to be encouraged in the moral education of adults who fail of this ideal attitude, let us go back again to the child we have left so long unattended to.

He has failed to control himself in the performance of a

distasteful duty. The formed character and valued ideal of the good man are impossible to the child. But it is our object to develop these, and we shall do so best by appealing to the noblest of the motives which may be vital in him. This, as we saw, will be the motive whose value is felt by the highest part of the child's nature: the part that feels pleasure in the good of others, or in the approval of those whom he loves and respects. We may tell him he is disturbing his class, and preventing others from doing what they want to do and what he knows they ought to do. This will be a good motive. But if the child fails to value it, we may appeal to what is probably the earliest good motive a child has,—*i.e.*, his love of his mother and his desire for her approval. A good mother carries at all times the conscience of her child. He never dreams of doubting her wisdom; her approval means for him that he has done well. The sacred responsibility of being worthy of this faith, and of deepening this power by integrity and love is one of the deepest that life brings.

But the motive may be ineffective through lack of faith or love on the child's part, and it remains to appeal to his social sympathy, his fear of disgrace in the eyes of his class, fear of temporary banishment from his companions, fear of losing his place in his class, or, finally, to fear of some arbitrarily selected punishment, as, for instance, a whipping. The value of the appeal to his social sympathy will depend for the child, as for the adult, on the moral tone of the public appealed to. If the moral tone be high, public approval will emphasize and develop the child's conscience, and will be good. But if the tone be low the thought of public favor will either have the opposite effect from that intended, or it will move the child through his desire for its pleasantness merely, which is bad. Love of popularity is not love of the people any more than love of Love is love of a person. To be worthy of noble love is a high and powerful and worthy motive, but to do this or that merely that we may win love is pure selfishness, whether the love aimed at be love from God or love from man. Moreover, to threaten a child with loss of love, or to treat it with

anger rather than with sorrow, is peculiarly wicked. We ruin his idea of the divinest thing he knows, the divinest thing, when it is at its best, that he can ever know. For we do not merely threaten him with the loss of the love that is a delight in, the love that is a response to, beauty or goodness, but we teach him to doubt the love that "suffereth long and is kind," the love that "never faileth," the love that is a belief and interest in his humanity, the love that we all owe one another, whether we are objects of beauty and joy or not.

I have spoken of the motive of competition. The worthiness of this motive is, of course, a burning question to-day. No one, I suppose, will deny that it has been not only a powerful but a valuable spur to effort in the past; no one, perhaps, contemplates as either possible or desirable its total obliteration in the future, but the need of careful thought as to the form and extent to which it is desirable is a commonplace to-day. Without presuming to attempt the answer to so difficult a problem, I may just point out some obvious reflections, most of which are already current among us.

1. It is evident that the competition of communities is less anti-social than the competition of individuals. It would be therefore better to urge the child not to ruin the record of his class among other classes than to urge him not to ruin his own record as compared with his companions.

2. It is finer to compete for excellence or for honor than for any prize beyond these. Therefore, it would be well, if prizes are offered at all, to let them be mere mementos of honor. The so-called prizes of bursaries and scholarships are, of course, of a wholly different order. They are not offered as a bait to zeal, and are competed for merely as a means of determining the greatest fitness of the candidates. Better days will, it is to be hoped, make these prizes unnecessary by putting such opportunities in the hands of all.

3. The exhilarating pleasure of social, as compared with solitary work, the stimulation of measuring one's self against others, may be kept largely free from the desire to surpass others, wholly free from the desire to gain what others must lose.

I am reminded, at this point, of Aristotle's way of solving a difficulty which arose in his consideration of friendship.* The question had been started, whether a good man must most love and honor his friend or himself. A good man, Aristotle says, must be self-loving. But, then, his true self is the highest in him; that part in him which delights in giving all to his friend, in furthering his friend's good. To love this noble part of himself means to further its interests, and its interests imply the unlimited giving to his friend of all good things, even of the opportunity of doing noble actions. But in giving all these good things, even in giving away noble opportunities, the man yet necessarily retains what is best of all for himself,—that is, he retains the highest virtue and the noblest love. In other words, in these highest things in life, to give is to get, to get is to give. The highest we can do for ourselves is at all times the highest we can do for others.

Is it, then, too much to hope that a day will come when the competition that most absorbs us shall be the competition in the service of a common good, not, that is, a competition for the honor of public service, but a competition as to who shall further most the chance of each to render those services.[‡] This is a form of competition from which we have nothing to fear. The good thus attained is not attained at the cost of others; to thus surpass is to confer opportunities of a surpassing excellence, which will in turn confer upon others further like opportunities. The solution, as it seems to me, of our present difficulties in this matter must lie at least in this direction.

What I have already said as to punishment of adults holds with regard to children. Its object in the last resort is the enforcement on the mind of the child of the inviolability for the community of the laws he has broken, and of his responsibility as a moral agent. The certainty and justice of the punishment are the chief points of importance. With children the form of the punishment may, with more frequent

* Aristotle's "Ethics," bk. ix. chap. viii.

advantage than with adults, indicate the nature of the offence, while the essential aims of education and penitence must receive preponderating consideration.

As to reward, I have already said something when speaking of prizes. It is best when this is given in the form of some advantage to the whole, of which the individual is a part (as a prize to the class rather than to any child), but is so arranged that it gains in value by every attainment of each individual child. Then each may feel that he can further, in however humble a way, the pleasure or good of all, while the prize, when gained, can never be a merely selfish pleasure. The best individual prize is that which confers upon an excellent individual the opportunity of performing further excellent acts. I remember being much amused by hearing once a Scotch mother say to her child, "Now, Jeanie, if you wash the kitchen floor really well, I shall allow you to wash down the stairs." That was an eminently noble kind of reward. "Faithfulness unto death" is rightly rewarded with "the crown of life," for "the crown of life" is just a perfected faithfulness.

For children, too, as for the adult, the joys of achievement, the enthusiasm of interest, may be deepened by association. All who are accustomed to children know how they expand under praise, how their interests become intensified by the interest shown in them by those they love. This show of interest should be continual; this vivid appreciation should never be wanting. The love with which he should be surrounded should be brought home to the child every moment, his joy augmented by his mother's joy, his pain at wrongdoing rendered intolerable by sight of his mother's pain.

The great power of art, too, plays a mighty part in the lives of children. Up from the mother's lullaby, through the fairyland of picture-book and story, the path runs all the way unbroken. All the way the lovely forms of truth and goodness bear the child company; at every step they grow more familiar; at every step they are seen and learned anew, till, step by step, the child acquires and makes his own the most precious heritage of the man.

To sum up, then, we shall seek to deepen, in every way in our power, pleasure in well doing, for, "to like and dislike what one ought is judged to be most important for the formation of good moral character."* We shall seek to deepen the pleasure or interest in good ends or objects; we shall seek to avoid the immorality of directing interest to the attainment of pleasure merely as such; we shall develop the pleasures of a noble self-realization by training ourselves and others in self-control, and the capacity of self-sacrifice, through a judicious abstinence and a healthy hardihood; above all, we shall cherish by example, and by precept, and by all the resources of art, those ideals of noble living for the love of which men can bear any pain or lose any lower pleasure; we shall try to make these interests, in the furthering of which our ideal consists, our very life, until, in our longing after that personal perfection which is to be found in the best possible furthering of that ideal, we shall be ready to cry,—

Then welcome each rebuff
That turns earth's smoothness rough,
Each sting that bids, nor sit, nor stand, but go !
Be our joys three parts pain,
Strive, and hold cheap the strain;
Learn, nor account the pang; dare never grudge the throe !

M. S. GILLILAND.

* Aristotle's "Ethics," x. i.